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When I took the introductory Constitutional Law course in the spring of 1992, 
federalism was the subject of three or four days at most, most of them spent on the 
dormant Commerce Clause. My classmates and I were told that the Supreme Court had 
abandoned any effort to limit national power under the Constitution after 1937, and - not 
surprisingly - legal scholars had largely abandoned the subject as well. In the intervening 
two decades since my 2L year, however, federalism returned to the Supreme Court's 
docket in landmark cases like United States v. Lopez, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, and 
Printz v. United States. Likewise, the end of reliable Democratic dominance in 
Congress and the presidency of George W. Bush shook liberals' instinctive preference 
for national power, at the same time that a host of new issues emerged - gay marriage, 
global warming - on which at least some states seemed more progressive than the 
national government. It is hardly surprising that federalism has made it back onto the 
legal academy's teaching and research agenda. 
We have thus experienced not one "Federalist Revival," but three: judicial, 
political, and intellectual. The three books that form the subject of this review provide 
ample evidence of this third revival. Alison LaCroix's The Ideological Origins of 
American Federalism challenges the conventional wisdom that our federalism dates 
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from the early Federalists' republican conception of popular sovereignty. Malcolm 
Feeley and Edward Rubin's Federalism: Political Identity & Tragic Compromise 
develops a general theoretical account of federalism and advances the bracing claim that 
federalism does not, in fact, exist in contemporary America. And Robert Schapiro's 
Polyphonic Federalism rejects traditional notions of dual federalism in favor of a 
synergistic relation between national and state institutions. 
Each of these excellent books challenges settled notions about American 
federalism. And yet each, in some ways, remains thoroughly conventional in its approach 
and assumptions. All three see the American constitutional tradition as predicated upon a 
"dual federalism" model in which state and federal institutions govern largely separate 
spheres defined by regulatory subject matters, although Professor Schapiro seeks to 
move beyond this model. Both the Feeley/Rubin and Schapiro books see this traditional 
model as intimately tied to citizens' political identities - and therefore worthless in a 
world in which citizens identify primarily with the Nation. And none of these authors has 
a kind word to say about the contemporary Supreme Court's efforts to protect federalism 
by limiting national power; like most of the Academy, they see the Constitution as 
imposing little or no constraint upon contemporary national action. 
This review takes a more sympathetic stance toward constitutional constraints on 
national power, although I find much to learn from and admire in each of these three 
contributions to the literature. Part I offers a brief overview of all three books. Part II 
turns to the relationship between federalism and constitutional entrenchment, while part 
III contrasts "separate spheres" and concurrent models of federalism. Part IV addresses 
the relationship between federalism and political identity. 
I. THREE TAKES ON FEDERALISM 
Most histories of American federalism begin with the founding period. In these 
accounts, federalism is a product of the Founders' republican ideology and, in particular, 
the Federalists' decision to cast the People (always with a capital "P") as the traditional 
unitary sovereign, with the national and state governments each exercising sovereign 
powers delegated to them by the People in the Constitution. As Justice Kennedy 
famously said, 
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It 
was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state 
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution 
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of 
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. 
5. Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity & Tragic Compromise (U. Mich. 
Press 2008). 
6. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights (U. Chi. 
Press 2009). 
7. See e.g. Forrest McDonald, States' Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio 1776-1876, at 1-5 (U. 
Press Kan. 2000); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (U.N.C. Press 1998). 
8. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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On this account, American federalism was both fundamentally new and a product of 
debates about political theory. 
Alison LaCroix's new treatment challenges both these elements of the 
conventional wisdom. Extending the historical frame backward past the Constitutional 
Convention, she takes in a number of episodes that many federalism scholars have 
neglected, including the North American colonists' seventeenth- and early eighteenth-
century experiments with colonial union within the British Empire, the seventeenth-
century assimilation of Ireland and Scotland into Great Britain, and - most important -
the debates about imperial governance in the mid-eighteenth century that culminated in 
the American Revolution. "Beginning with the Stamp Act crisis," LaCroix writes, 
some colonial observers . . . began to push toward a system that formally recognized two 
distinct levels of government within the empire, each with its proper sphere of legislative 
power. In this way, then, two central elements of American federal ideology were defined 
during the debates of the 1760s: first, structuring a government to include multiple levels 
of authority; and second, dividing that authority along subject-specific lines. 
LaCroix is not the only historian of federalism to tread this ground, but her return to 
this material serves as a useful corrective to the contemporary tendency to treat 
federalism as if it sprang from the forehead of James Madison and James Wilson. 
This earlier focus yields dividends even as LaCroix moves forward into more 
familiar debates surrounding the Convention and the early republic. LaCroix traces 
James Madison's proposal for a congressional "negative" on state laws, for example, to 
the English Privy Council's legislative review of colonial acts. The defeat of 
Madison's negative marked a shift "toward a vision of federal authority that relied not on 
I T 
legislatures but on judges and courts to mediate among disparate sources of law." This 
shift had implications for how national and state power would be divided. "The negative 
implied concurrence: every matter that the states could reach and regulate could also be 
reached and regulated by Congress by virtue of its power to negate state laws"; by 
contrast, "[t]he Supremacy Clause identified and created a body of supreme law of the 
land that was, according to Article I, circumscribed along subject-specific lines such that 
there was no concurrence with the substantive areas of state law." 
Moreover, because of the new emphasis on law and courts, battles over federalism 
increasingly took place on the terrain of federal judicial jurisdiction. LaCroix thus 
concludes her study by identifying contrasting visions of federalism embodied in the 
1789 Judiciary Act and its abortive successor, the Federalists' expansive Judiciary Act of 
1801. From this overall experience, LaCroix derives several "key themes" of American 
9. LaCroix, supra n. 4, at 35. 
10. See e.g. Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism 139-214 (1993) 
(surveying the debates between imperial England and the American colonists). 
11. See LaCroix, supra n. 4, at 145-158. 
12. Id. at 164. 
13. Id at 171. 
14. See id at 175-213. The 1801 Act was, of course, repealed shortly after the Republicans took office 
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federalism: "multilayered authority as a conceptual matter; overlapping institutions 
(sometimes legislative, sometimes judicial) as a practical matter; and a belief that the 
division of authority among levels of government should be determined according to the 
subject matter at issue.' 
In contrast to LaCroix's historical treatment, the Feeley and Rubin book bills itself 
as an "effort to remedy the surprising lack of theoretical writing about federalism." 
With their customary courtesy toward those who disagree with them, Professor Feeley 
and Dean Rubin announce that "[d]espite the alleged tough-mindedness of political 
scientists, U.S. Supreme Court justices, and legal scholars, their treatment of the subject 
remains mired in sentimental attachment to the idea of federalism, replete with appeals to 
nostalgia-driven sentiments, the bromides of high school civics, and conceptual 
confusion." Feeley and Rubin aim to shine a light in this darkness by providing a 
"general account" of federalism - that is, "an analytical framework that is connected to 
some overarching conceptual approach to modern government," and that "applies in any 
situation and at any time." 
This general account begins by describing federalism as "a means of governing a 
polity that grants partial autonomy to geographically defined subdivisions of the 
polity." The interesting features of the account emerge as Feeley and Rubin distinguish 
"federalism" from other superficially similar forms of government - most importantly, 
from "decentralization" and "local democracy." Federalism differs from decentralization 
in that, under federalism, "there must be some types of decisions that are reserved to the 
subsidiary governmental units and that the central government may not displace or 
countermand"; that is, "the subsidiary units possess rights against the central 
government." This is a point about entrenchment: under federalism, the central 
government may not alter decentralized decisions and institutional structures by ordinary 
01 
legal means. 
Federalism differs from local democracy in that, under the former, "the subunits 
must exercise exclusive jurisdiction over some set of issues." It is insufficient for a 
political system simply to guarantee the institutional structure of the subunits against 
central interference; rather, those subunits must have an exclusive say over particular 
areas of regulation defined by subject matter. "[Without a substantive component," 
Feeley and Rubin assert, "federalism ceases to be a distinguishable mode of 
governmental organization." In this way, Feeley and Rubin insist that only one of 
following the election of 1800. 
15. H a t 7. 
16. Feeley & Rubin, supra n. 5, at 3. 
17. M a t 2 . 
18. M a t 4, 5. 
19. M a t 12. 
20. Id. at 16; see also id. at 20-21 ("Decentralization, in contrast, is a managerial strategy by which a 
centralized regime can achieve the results it desires in a more effective manner . . . the central government 
decides how decision-making authority will be divided between itself and the geographical subunits."). 
21. See e.g. William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 11 (Little, Brown & Co. 1964) 
(defining federalism as existing when the "autonomy of each government in its own sphere" is protected by a 
constitutional "guarantee"). 
22. Feeley & Rubin, supra n. 5, at 16. 
23. M a t 3 2 . 
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many federalism models discussed in the wider literature - a "separate spheres" or "dual 
federalism" model - is consistent with their general account. 
For Feeley and Rubin, federalism is meaningful only as a solution to the problem 
of multiple political identities existing within the same polity. "If people identify 
exclusively with the nation as a whole," they argue, "they have no consistent reason to 
desire or demand that geographic subdivisions of the polity possess autonomy rights." 
Regional identity is thus crucial to federalism: 
Only when [the people's] identity is divided between the nation and a geographic region or 
exclusively linked to such a region will they want the region to possess some level of 
autonomy, so that it can make choices that the center cannot countermand. In other words, 
regional autonomy will only be appealing to people if the region itself is meaningful to 
people, that is, if it relates to their sense of political identity. 
Federalism's connection to identity lends it a "tragic" character. Feeley and Rubin 
acknowledge that "a nation whose people disagree about the structure of the polity may 
remain intact and function through federalism, but it signals the nation's inability to 
develop a unified political identity." They reject arguments that federalism protects 
diversity or liberty in any meaningful sense, arguing that federalism can only be 
T O 
justified by the existence of intractable conflicts over political identity. Happily, they 
report, no such tragic necessity exists in contemporary America: "the American 
people . . . have a unified political identity. Not only do they identify themselves 
primarily as Americans, but they insist on normative uniformity throughout the 
nation." Feeley and Rubin argue that "federalism no longer serves any purpose in the 
United States," and they attribute the (supposed) incoherence of Supreme Court 
doctrine on the subject to this fact. Their ultimate conclusion - which may come as a 
surprise to other scholars of American federalism - is that "federalism is no longer an 
operative principle in the United States.' 
Robert Schapiro's book differs from Rubin and Feeley's in that it believes that 
there is such a thing as American federalism and that that principle even includes 
24. H a t 16. 
25. Id. 
26. M a t 4 8 . 
27. Feeley & Rubin, supra n. 5, at 53-54, 55-57. 
28. Feeley and Rubin go so far as to suggest that 
the function of federalism in an ongoing regime can be plausibly analogized to abdominal surgery. 
It is an extremely valuable expedient, necessary, under certain circumstances, to the continued 
existence of the patient. It involves a certain amount of risk, however, and a great deal of discomfort 
. . . [N]o sane person or polity would resort to such expedients . . . unless they were necessary. 
Id. at 60. 
29. H a t 115. 
30. Id. at 122. 
31. See id. at 126 ("Because federalism has ceased to be an operative principle in modem American 
government, decisions that strike down national legislation in its name are little more than either random firings 
of a nostalgia-driven dissatisfaction with modernity or political tropisms that reflect the judges' underlying 
views about substantive and otherwise non-justiciable matters of policy."). 
32. Feeley & Rubin, supra n. 5, at ix. 
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something worth preserving. Schapiro agrees, however, that federalism in its traditional 
form makes little sense in a world where citizens no longer identify with their states. He 
acknowledges that "[t]o the extent that states do reflect integral communities of value, 
with moral and cultural views different from those of other states, then allocating certain 
kinds of power to the states make sense." But "[w]ithout division on key principles, 
federalism is not necessary." Schapiro thus rejects the traditional "dual federalism" 
model that allocated particular subject-matter competences to the national government 
and the states. This rejection entails a critique of most contemporary federalism 
jurisprudence and profederalism scholarship, which Schapiro finds to be irretrievably 
dualist in character. 
In place of dualism, Schapiro advocates a "polyphonic" conception of federalism. 
In music, polyphony describes "the simultaneous and harmonious combination of a 
number of individual melodic lines" - as in Bach's fugues or Pachelbel's canon. For 
Schapiro, "the key elements of polyphonic federalism are the protection of the 
institutional integrity of multiple sources of power and the promotion of the dynamic 
interaction of those centers of authority." This conception "remains federalist" in the 
sense that "the allocation of authority between the states and the national government has 
constitutional status," but this constitutional allocation does not protect exclusive 
domains of state authority. Rather, what the Constitution protects is simply "the 
institutional integrity of states" and "[t]he continued functioning of each state's political 
,,41 
apparatus. 
The primary doctrinal bite of Schapiro's proposal, however, comes from his 
elimination of dualist doctrines that restrict both national and state power. On the 
national side, polyphonic federalism frees Congress from enumerated powers limits on 
its authority, as well as from other constitutional doctrines like state sovereign 
immunity. On the state side, polyphony counsels a narrower approach to the 
preemptive impact of federal statutes on state law, a circumscribed dormant Commerce 
Clause, and a cutback on special doctrines restricting state participation in foreign 
affairs. The latter chapters of the book focus on the judicial aspects of polyphony - that 
is, the benefits of "intersystemic adjudication," or the concurrent enforcement of federal 
rights by state courts. All of this, however, is meant to further a fundamental shift in 
federalism's orientation: federalism should no longer be about drawing boundaries 
between state and federal power, but rather a means of harnessing the capacities of both 
33. Schapiro,supra n. 6, at 27. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 56-85. 
36. See id. at 57-73. 
37. Id. at 94 (quoting Oxford English Dictionary Online (draft revision June 2007), http://www.oed.com/). 
38. Schapiro, supra n. 6, at 96. 
39. Id 
40. See id. at 96-97 ("Congress does not face limits on the subject matter of its regulatory authority."). 
41. M a t 9 6 . 
42. H a t 111-112. 
43. Shapiro, supra n. 6, at 113-120. 
44. See id. at 121-173. 
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state and federal governments to serve national ends. 
Each of these books raises a rich and diverse set of issues, and I cannot hope to 
analyze them all in the limited space permitted here. I want to focus instead on three 
persistent themes: the extent to which our federal system is (or must be) constitutionally 
entrenched; the contrast between dual and concurrent allocations of governmental 
competences in a federal system; and the relationship between federalism and political 
identity. 
II. FEDERALISM, DECENTRALIZATION, AND ENTRENCHMENT 
For Feeley and Rubin, constitutional entrenchment defines the difference between 
federalism and decentralization: Federalism is a decentralized institutional arrangement 
that cannot be altered by the central authority, where the subunits have rights that 
function as "trumps" against central power. Advantages of decentralized 
administration - such as state-by-state policy variance or experimentation - cannot be 
attributed to federalism unless they can be linked to the entrenchment of the 
decentralized arrangement. Feeley and Rubin originally made the entrenchment point in 
their famous article, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis. Their distinction 
between federalism and unentrenched decentralization has been quite influential, but a 
number of scholars have responded by arguing that constitutional entrenchment may 
enhance the benefits of decentralization in various ways. The new Feeley and Rubin 
book makes virtually no effort to engage these arguments - it is as if a decade and a half 
of critical commentary on their argument had never been written. 
I want to make a different point about entrenchment, however, which is that 
constitutional federalism is not a binary matter of entrenched and unentrenched 
structures, but rather a continuum comprised of many different sorts of legal 
arrangements that are more or less difficult to alter. Consider the recent case of Gonzales 
v. Oregon, which involved efforts at the national level to overturn Oregon's decision to 
allow physician-assisted suicide. There was no doubt, in Gonzales, that Congress had the 
constitutional power to regulate the drugs used in physician-assisted suicide and that 
therefore Congress could preempt the Oregon law through ordinary legislation. In this 
sense, physician-assisted suicide did not fall into any constitutionally entrenched area of 
state sovereignty. On the other hand, Congress had not so acted, and instead the Bush 
administration had sought to preempt the Oregon law through an administrative 
regulation issued by the Attorney General. The question before the Court was thus 
45. See id. at 176. 
46. For other definitions of federalism that emphasize constitutional entrenchment, see Riker, supra n. 21; 
Thomas R. Dye, American Federalism: Competition Among Governments 5 (Lexington Bks. 1990) (arguing 
that federalism requires that "the autonomy of the subnational governments must be given exceptional legal 
protection, such as a written constitution that cannot be amended without the consent of both national and 
subnational populations"). 
47. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. 
Rev. 903 (1994). 
48. See e.g. Lynn A. Baker, Federalism: The Argument from Article V, 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 923 (1997); 
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 
2216-2228 (1998); Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 874, 883 
(2006). 
49. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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whether the Attorney General's regulation was authorized by the underlying statute, the 
Controlled Substance Act ("CSA").50 
The important point for present purposes is that the Supreme Court's finding that 
the CSA did not authorize the regulation gave the State of Oregon, or anyone relying on 
the Oregon statute, an enforceable right against the national government. Just as the 
Constitution trumps a federal statute, so too does a federal statute (or the limitations in 
that statute) trump a federal regulation. Entrenchment is thus a relative concept. Even a 
constitutional provision, like the Commerce Clause, is not entrenched categorically - it 
may be overturned by a constitutional amendment. Amendments are extremely difficult 
in our system, but Feeley and Rubin are presumably willing to call "federal" even 
systems, like Canada or Australia, with constitutions that are considerably easier to 
amend. In any event, Gonzales illustrates the fact that lesser degrees of entrenchment -
for example, the need to amend the underlying CSA in order to overturn Oregon's 
assisted suicide law - may confer enforceable rights on states, with important practical 
consequences. 
Seen from this perspective, any bright-line definitional contrast between federalism 
and decentralization becomes much more complex. This has important consequences for 
Feeley and Rubin's argument. Drawing a sharp line between federalism and 
decentralization allows them to discount most of the benefits commonly attributed to 
federalism, such as policy competition and experimentation or popular participation in 
government, as attainable through decentralization alone. That leaves Feeley and Rubin 
free to assert that protection of distinctive political identities is the only benefit accruing 
to federalism per se, and that this benefit is obsolete in contemporary America. This 
argument crumbles if entrenchment is always relative, and the actual structure of 
decentralized government in America combines aspects of enforceable federalism in a 
wide variety of institutional contexts. By defining federalism so narrowly as to exclude 
virtually all aspects of American governance, Feeley and Rubin have scored some 
debaters' points but rendered their argument irrelevant to meaningful conversations 
about American law. 
The Schapiro and LaCroix books both illustrate the failings of Feeley and Rubin's 
abstract approach. Schapiro likewise views entrenchment as important to federalism, 
but the aspects of polyphony that seem most practically significant - his approach to 
preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause, and intersystemic adjudication - all involve 
rules that are subject to congressional alteration without a constitutional amendment. 
Both judges and scholars (including this one) have written that statutory preemption 
cases are the most important battleground of contemporary federalism, and Schapiro 
50. Id. at 243-244. 
51. See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, § 38; 
Australia Constitution Act, 1900, (U.K.), Chapt. VIII. 
52. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 429-433 
(2007) (discussing Gonzales v. Oregon). 
53. Schapiro, supra n. 6, at 96. 
54. See e.g. Egelhoffv. Egelhojf, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Thomas O. McGarity, 
The Preemption War: When Federal Bureaucracies Trump Local Juries (Yale U. Press 2008); Ernest A. 
Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in Federal Preemption: States' Powers, National Interests 
ch. 9 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., AEI Press 2007). 
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rightly recognizes what Feeley and Rubin ignore - that is, that the ways courts interpret 
federal statutes have profound implications for the federal balance. 
LaCroix's work also recognizes, at least implicitly, the importance of federal 
structures that are not constitutionally entrenched. Certainly the antecedents of American 
federalism in the law of the British Empire would not have been entrenched in the 
American sense, given the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The notion 
of federalism as law that a court may rely upon to invalidate an act of Congress - which 
LaCroix sees as the paradigm that emerged from the defeat of Madison's negative - does 
entail an important degree of constitutional entrenchment. But the critical aspect of this 
development is the enforcement of federal structures by courts, and that enforcement 
occurs not only when a court strikes down an act of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause, say, but also when it invalidates a federal regulation as inconsistent with the 
intent of Congress or interprets a federal statute narrowly to avoid preempting state law. 
Indeed, the latter forms of judicial enforcement are far more common in our system. 
Rubin and Feeley may be correct that real federalism requires at least some core of 
decentralized authority that the central authority, as a practical matter, cannot alter. 
Where they go wrong is in assuming that all less-entrenched institutional structures are 
irrelevant to federalism. Moreover, the shape of the essential core need not necessarily 
take the traditional form of a fixed allocation of authority ordered by subject matter. I 
take up that point in the next section. 
55. For example, Feeley and Rubin discount the Court's leading case on federalism-protective clear 
statement canons of statutory construction, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452 (1991), as "not a constitutional 
decision." Feeley & Rubin, supra n. 5, at 138. But scholars have recognized for decades the importance of clear 
statement rules as part of how constitutional values are enforced. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation 
Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (2000); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 
Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992). For an account of 
Gregory as representing a new paradigm for judicial enforcement of federalism, see Ernest A. Young, The 
Story a/" Gregory v. Ashcroft: Clear Statement Rules and the Statutory Constitution of American Federalism, in 
Statutory Interpretation Stories (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett eds., West 
2010). 
56. See A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 3 (8th ed.,,London: 
Macmillan 1915) ("The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means . . . that Parliament... has . . . the right 
to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England 
as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament."); Beer, supra n. 10, at 146-153 (arguing 
that English notions of parliamentary sovereignty made the American vision of federalism impossible). 
57. When developing some contemporary implications of her book in subsequent blog posts, LaCroix has 
suggested that the historical meaning of federalism "has centered on a commitment to governmental 
multiplicity itself more than a vision of a particular distribution of governmental authority." Alison LaCroix, 
Balkinization, Commandeering Federalism, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/04/commandeering-
federalism.html (Apr. 7, 2010). It is not clear that LaCroix's somewhat different take on the relevant history 
justifies her accusation that "the Supreme Court's recent 'federalism revolution' has [not] been . . . about 
federalism in any historically informed sense." Id.; after all, the Court's cases discuss the history at length, and 
LaCroix has not addressed, much less refuted, the bulk of the relevant arguments. In any event, the fact that the 
Framers may not have had a fixed allocation of power in mind hardly proves that any possible allocation would 
be constitutional. The limits of LaCroix's position become clear if we substitute, say, "due process" for 
federalism. The Constitution plainly does not specify the content of "due process of law" - much less "liberty" -
with any particularity either (beyond the more specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, which are themselves 
"specific" only in comparison to concepts like "due process" or "equal protection"). Does anyone think that 
this means the State may alter the balance between governmental authority and personal liberty as it pleases? 
Our constitutional tradition has instead understood due process as protecting an irreducible core of personal 
liberty against government intrusion, notwithstanding the ambiguity of the constitutional definition of that core. 
So too with federalism. 
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III. OF SEPARATE SPHERES AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
All three books start with a "separate spheres" model of federalism - that is, a 
model in which the Constitution allocates exclusive authority over particular subject 
matters, such as education or foreign affairs, to either the nation or the states. 
Historically, this model has been described as "dual federalism"; as Alpheus Mason 
wrote, it contemplates "two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power -
that of the national government and of the States. The two authorities confront each other 
as equals across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions."5 
LaCroix argues that division of regulatory jurisdiction according to subject matter was 
integral to the historical conception of federalism in the eighteenth century. Feeley and 
Rubin contend that such a division is necessary to distinguish federalism from local 
democracy, and that geographical subunits cannot reflect distinctive political identities 
unless they have exclusive jurisdiction over certain subjects. And Schapiro insists that 
current doctrine and scholarship about federalism remains firmly in the dual federalism 
mold, although he argues that American federalism must move beyond that model. 
Schapiro is surely right that concurrency is the key to a successful federalism in 
contemporary America. As I have argued elsewhere, courts have found it prohibitively 
difficult to draw jurisdictional lines that can be enforced in a principled way, and they 
have largely given up trying. Schapiro's book is frustratingly unwilling to acknowledge 
that much current doctrine and legal scholarship already adopts a concurrent model. 
Most of the Supreme Court's decisions limiting national power have either prohibited 
Congress from requiring the states to enforce federal law or restricted the remedies 
available when states violate federal statutes. Even the Rehnquist Court's famous 
Commerce Clause decisions were so narrow that they can hardly be said to be carving 
out substantive areas of exclusive state authority. Similarly, most legal scholars writing 
about federalism today appear to adopt some version of, or at least to be heavily 
influenced by, "process federalism" theories that emphasize the political protection of 
the states in the national governmental process and/or the procedural protection 
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afforded for state autonomy by the sheer difficulty of making federal law. The 
persistent dualist model that Schapiro attacks is thus something of a straw man. 
It is, of course, no fun to be an academic unless one can portray oneself as 
swimming against the tide. The more significant problem with Schapiro's particular 
version of concurrency is that it lacks meaningful state-protective content. To be sure, 
Schapiro is barking up the right tree when he suggests that, given the concurrency of 
state and federal powers, the courts should read federal statutes narrowly to avoid 
preempting state law. But beyond this, the notion of "polyphony" remains troublingly 
vague. Schapiro's theory of polyphony seems to have few resources for identifying 
situations in which the fugue-like complementarity of national and state authority 
becomes a discordant drowning-out of state autonomy. 
As I have already suggested, the contemporary federalism literature already offers 
other concurrent authority models. For half a century, judges and scholars have accorded 
a virtually unlimited substantive scope to Congress's powers while looking for ways to 
enforce, and sometimes enhance, the political and procedural safeguards that protect 
state autonomy in a concurrent world. Notwithstanding Feeley and Rubin's 
condescending dismissal of process federalism as "conceptual mush," a concurrent 
federalism model that emphasizes clear lines of political accountability and enforcement 
of the procedural barriers to federal lawmaking does offer concrete bases for limiting 
federal action in important contexts. More broadly, Schapiro's general idea of shifting 
from an adversarial federalism to a polyphonic cooperation to advance national values 
may unwisely jettison federalism's integral role as part of a system of constitutional 
checks and balances. As James Madison noted in Federalist 51, federalism - along with 
separation of powers at the national level - is part of the "double security" that 
guarantees individual liberty in our system. Any theory of federalism that is directed 
"toward the protection of fundamental rights" would do well to remember that 
principle. 
IV. FEDERALISM AND IDENTITY 
Schapiro, Feeley, and Rubin all stress the decline of distinctive and compelling 
state political identities as the basic reason either to redirect our notions of federalism or 
to discard them altogether. Because we are all Americans now - not Texans or 
Californians or Vermonters - there is no point in protecting some exclusive domain of 
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state authority in which states might express a distinctive vision of the good life. In this 
last part, I want to probe both the empirical foundations of that argument and its 
implications. 
The death of state political identity is an empirical claim. But neither the Schapiro 
nor the Feeley and Rubin book provides any empirical evidence to support that claim. To 
be sure, it would be a devilishly difficult claim to verify empirically. How does one 
measure political identity? When Sandy Levinson and I taught a seminar at the 
University of Texas School of Law, we began by asking our students "What are you?" 
To our very great surprise, the overwhelming majority said "Texans," not "Americans" 
or "Democrats" or "Cowboys fans.' But I am unaware of any social scientist who has 
tried to ask this question to large numbers of people in a systematic way. One can find 
surveys measuring arguably related variables, such as the relative confidence that people 
express in the various levels of government (they consistently favor state and local), or 
the degree to which people move from state to state over the course of their lives. The 
important point is that neither Feeley and Rubin nor Schapiro has undertaken any of this 
work. 
One might instead seek to measure the extent to which the states are politically or 
culturally distinctive from one another. Here there is more data: there is an extensive 
debate among social scientists concerning whether "red" and "blue" states are really that 
different from one another, for example, and this literature includes evidence on the 
extent to which attitudes about, say, abortion differ from state to state. Both the 
Feeley/Rubin and Schapiro books mention this literature-in passing, although they tend 
to take the "no polarization" view as clearly correct when in fact there is continuing 
debate. Moreover, it is unclear whether distinctiveness is even the right question. After 
all, inhabitants of Canada, Great Britain, and France may have remarkably similar views 
on most political questions and yet still identify strongly with their respective nations. 
In any event, neither Feeley and Rubin nor Schapiro makes any effort to explore 
these questions. That is a serious problem, given how central the death of state identity is 
to the claims in these two books. Their assertion may well match the intuitions of other 
legal academics, who often seem to see themselves as members of a national community, 
but that hardly tells us much about the vast majority of Americans. We ought to demand 
more in the way of empirical support before accepting claims that the states no longer 
represent meaningful political communities. 
If these authors are correct that state political identity has largely eroded in this 
country, the question remains whether we should celebrate that fact as a reason to 
dispense with federalism altogether (Feeley and Rubin) or adopt a vision of federalism 
dedicated to the advancement of common national goals (Schapiro) - or instead view that 
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erosion with concern. The case for concern arises from the probability that federalism 
serves other important purposes unrelated to accommodating clashes of identity. For 
example, LaCroix's account of the origins of American federal ideology stresses the 
checking function - originally, the North American colonists' desire to check the 
authority of the British Crown - rather than the need to accommodate distinctive, 
preexisting political identities in each of the individual colonies. Feeley and Rubin 
discount the importance of the checking function, but they ignore much recent 
literature demonstrating the varied ways in which state autonomy promotes fruitful 
dissent and limits national power in ways beneficial to liberty. 
It may well be the case that although federalism serves functions other than 
accommodating state political identities, some level of popular identification with or 
loyalty to a state is necessary to make that state an effective participant in our federal 
system. State identity, on this view, would be a means rather than an end. State 
governments may be more effective in checking the power of the central authority, for 
example, if their constituents strongly identify with state institutions and policies. James 
Madison's original account of the "political safeguards of federalism," after all, framed 
that dynamic as a competition for popular loyalty between the national and state 
80 
governments. 
If that is the case, then the pressing task for federalism scholars will be to 
understand whether state political identity can be revived. Such a revival might not rely 
on distinctive cultural, ethnic, or religious patterns, but rather upon critical political 
commitments such as social inclusion (gay marriage in Massachusetts), environmental 
protection (California's policy on warming), or retributive justice (capital punishment in 
Texas). States might thus seek to develop their own forms of "democratic patriotism" 
analogous to the identity that some European scholars and politicians have sought to 
o I 
build around commonly held notions of human rights. In any event, the present books 
highlight the importance of state political identity to understanding federalism, but they 
hardly represent the last word. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Hegel said that "[t]he Owl of Minerva takes its flight as the shades of night are 
gathering," meaning that intellectual justification of institutions often comes as those 
institutions are beginning to crumble. The current wave of intellectual interest in 
federalism may well be too late - the Supreme Court, after all, has backed away from its 
landmark federalism cases of the 1990s, and the Democrats' return to power in 
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Washington has renewed progressive enthusiasm for bold social and regulatory 
initiatives at the national level. Certainly Feeley and Rubin will welcome these 
developments, and it seems unlikely that either LaCroix or Schapiro would find them 
overly concerning. For those of us who believe that federalism is both an integral 
principle of our Constitution and a critical element of our political community, however, 
these books provide a valuable stimulus to further thought about how to revitalize our 
federal institutions. 
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by upholding Congress's authority to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in bankruptcy cases). - ~ 
